This paper attempts to develop a model of the lender of last resort (LOLR) from a Central Bank (CB) viewpoint. In a simple static setting, the CB should only rescue banks which are above a threshold size, thus providing an analytical basis for "too big to fail". In a dynamic setting, whereby both the probability of a (further) failure and the likelihood of a bank requiring LOLR being insolvent in each period are a function of CB's prior actions, which then influence the actions of banks and depositors, CB's optimal policy in liquidity support depends on the trade off between contagion and moral hazard effects. The optimal policy may be non-monotonic in bank size and is time varying, and it is also contingent on the probability of a failure, the likelihood of a bank requiring LOLR being insolvent, and random shocks. Our results show that contagion is the key factor affecting CB's incentives in providing LOLR and they also provide a rationalization for "constructive ambiguity". 
INTRODUCTION
There have been few formal models seeking to explain and to analyze how and why central banks have provided lender of last resort (LOLR) services to individual commercial banks, even though such acts have been a regular, albeit often contentious, part of a central bank's armory since Bagehot (1873) . One reason why there have been few formal models of LOLR is that many economists in this field believe that providing LOLR to individual banks, rather than to the market as a whole, is fundamentally misguided.
All economists accept the lessons of history that banking panics can occur, with depositors seeking to switch out of the deposits of banks perceived as riskier into currency, gold, foreign exchange or those banks perceived as safer. But many economists argue that the central bank's role in such cases should be limited to open market operations (OMO), injecting extra cash into the system as a whole, in order to maintain the aggregate money stock at its desired level. 2 As a generality, they believe central banks should not lend to individual banks, e.g. through a discount window; the market is as well or better informed than the central bank (CB) about the relative solvency of a bank short of liquidity. Given an aggregate sufficiency of high-powered money, illiquid (but solvent) banks will be able to borrow, e.g. in the interbank market, whereas potentially insolvent banks will be driven out of the system. Moreover, the monetary authorities will have incentives to exercise forbearance (Kane, 1992 ) and rescue banks that should have been closed; and the pursuit of financial stability by direct intervention may divert the CB from achieving its primary goal of controlling the monetary aggregates so as to achieve price stability. 3 There are two ripostes to this position. The first, though not the subject of this 2 See Bordo (1990) , Goodfriend and King (1988) , Humphrey (1989) , Kaufman (1991) , Schwartz (1988) , amongst others. 3 It is presumably on grounds such as these that the European Central Bank was prevented from assuming any LOLR role, (except by unanimous agreement of the participating members) in the Maastricht Treaty, Article 105. 6. paper, is the potential for "market failure". For example, when the Bank of New
York computer malfunctioned in 1985 and would not accept incoming payments for bond market dealings, the resultant illiquidity position soon ballooned to a point where no one counterparty bank could take on the risk of making a sufficiently large loan. It would have required a coordinated syndicate, but such syndicates take time to organize, and time was scarce. Next, in the aftermath of the BCCI failure, there were considerable deposit withdrawals from a string of small banks, run by Asians and serving the Asian community in the UK. They were (unjustly) tainted by association.
They had relied, almost entirely, on deposits from the local community, and their names were not known in the wholesale banking market. Although illiquid, rather than insolvent, they were not getting help from the market, so the Bank of England assisted them (Bank of England, 1992 , 1993 .
Most central banks would argue that their supervisory role -or their ready access to supervisory information -should give them access to additional information, not available in the market. Moreover, as in the case of the Bank of New York, when there is any large-scale need to redirect reserves, there must be a coordination problem. No one commercial-counterparty can single-handedly assume the credit risk, and there is no incentive for a single commercial bank to take on the time, effort and cost of coordinating the exercise of sorting out the problem. The Bank of England would tend to argue that most of its historical LOLR actions have primarily involved the provision of additional information combined with a coordinating role to encourage private sector financial institutions to resolve the problem, primarily by themselves. 4 Focusing on the micro aspects of central banks' intervention in dealing with market failure, Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (1998) build one of the rare formal models of LOLR. Using the framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , they analyze the 4 The problem in the case of Barings was that there was insufficient information on the potential close-out cost of Leeson's derivative position. With the Bank of England being unwilling to provide a guarantee to limit any such loss, no commercial institution was willing to buy Barings over the key weekend. moral hazard problem caused by bank managers' incentive to choose an inefficient technology that gives them some private benefit. This moral hazard problem, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), sets an upper limit to the finance that would be provided at interim dates by outside investors. When liquid shocks cannot be disentangled from solvency shocks, moral hazard on the commercial bank's investment creates a market failure. In the absence of CB intervention there is excessive liquidation of banks: the optimal continuation threshold is above the solvency threshold.
Then "The role of the central banks is to mutualize the solvency shocks: lucky banks will be taxed and unlucky banks subsidized." This is a stimulating model, but it does not address the macroeconomic policy concerns of central banks, nor does it deal with contagious risks in the banking system. But their work did provide an incentive to our attempt to model the main macro-policy considerations lying behind LOLR action and to examine both contagious and moral hazard risks in the macro framework.
We thus wish to focus here on a second concern that is at the macro level and affected by both contagious risks and moral hazard. We believe this concern has been important in the minds of central bankers in their application of LOLR. At the macro level, even if the CB is aware of particular examples of "market failure" at micro level, there is still an important judgement to be made about the appropriate balance between "market failure" on the one hand and "official intervention failure" on the other hand. See, for example, Bernanke (1983) , Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) , Gorton (1985) , among others for related discussions. 5 Moreover, contagious risks provide a strong and compelling call for CB to play the role of LOLR. Since the seminal contribution by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and the recent banking crises in Latin America and Asia, a growing literature on banking crises and financial contagion has emerged. This literature shows that the damage can spill over from the original bank to many other banks, which are either directly 5 It would be an interesting historical exercise to go over a central bank's LOLR record to see how far such actions could be explained as arising from particular examples of "market failure".
connected with the original bank or merely trading with those banks which are directly connected to the original troubled bank, and as a result the total damage may be compounded in a nonlinear fashion. For example, Gale (1998, 2000) analyze financial contagion as arising from a combination of incomplete markets and interconnectedness between a failing institution and other institutions. Incomplete markets are important because diversification is limited and the failure of one institution may worsen the position of another through a variety of channels. The literature identifies several channels for transmitting financial contagion, including payments/settlements systems (e.g. Bankhaus Herstatt), interbank deposit and correspondent systems (e.g. Continental Illinois), and effects via asset/liquidity prices. 6 While contagious risks provide a compelling reason for CB to play the role of LOLR, moral hazard effects and uncertainty at the macro level pose important challenges to CB in conducting LOLR.
Our aim is to provide a model of how central bankers behave and why they do so. To our best knowledge, our model of LOLR is the first attempt to address both effects of contagious risks and moral hazard at the macro level. Our main claim is that most studies of this topic implicitly involve a certainty equivalent postulate and thus ignore financial contagious risks. That is, the CB is just as confident and knowledgeable about the optimal level of open market operations, high-powered money and aggregate money stock after the onset of bank failures and panic, as it would have been if such a panic was prevented at the outset. We argue that when failures occur, it can lead to substantial financial contagious risks, as people start to panic and their behavior is likely to become far less predictable, and financial markets become much more volatile. Policy mistakes become much more likely in such an environment.
Let us take three examples. 7 First, the bank failures in the USA in the 1930s shifted 6 For contagious risks in payment/settlements system, see Rochet and Tirole (1996) A key feature in our static model is that we formalize the loss to a CB when it allows bank failures to occur. We assume that the CB is trying to achieve an (exogenously given) desired level of deposits in the system. When a failure occurs, due to financial contagion it causes further changes in deposits in the banking system as a whole. Although the CB can immediately take open market operations to offset the deposit change, it can still suffer a loss, as a result of getting macro-policy wrong in the uncertain macroeconomic environment with financial contagion. In a simple static setting, the CB should only rescue banks which are above a threshold size, thus providing an analytical basis for "too big to fail".
Another feature in our model is that we explicitly model both effects of financial contagion and moral hazard in dynamic setting, and our optimal LOLR policy is derived from the trade-off between the two effects. In the dynamic setting, both the probability of a further failure and the likelihood of a bank requiring LOLR being insolvent in each period are a function of CB's prior actions, which then through moral hazard effects influence the actions of banks and depositors. The optimal policy, based on the trade-off between contagion and moral hazard effects, may be non-monotonic in bank size and is time varying, and it is also contingent on the probability of a failure, the likelihood of a bank requiring LOLR being insolvent, and random shocks.
Our results thus provide a rationalization for "constructive ambiguity".
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up and analyzes the static model, which is followed by the dynamic model in Section 3. Concluding remarks are in Section 4, and some further empirical evidence of bank failures causing macro uncertainty in the Appendix.
THE STATIC MODEL

The Basic Setup
We start with a commercial banking system with many banks of varying sizes, and assume all of which choose a similar risk profile (h). We shall try to justify this assumption as a reasonable approximation to reality shortly. Given this preferred risk profile there is a probability (p) of a bank holding j of the system's deposits coming to the CB asking for LOLR assistance in any period. We set the initial volume of deposits at D * , a pre-determined desired level, 0 < j < D * .
If no bank seeks LOLR, as occurs with probability (1 − p), CB takes no action, D remains equal to D * , and the CB suffers no loss. If p occurs, with j > 0, the CB has to decide whether to say yes to the request for LOLR (S t = 1), or no (S t = 0). There is a probability, x, where x = f(h), that the bank (or banks) coming to the CB will also be insolvent. This is not revealed to the CB at this stage, and the CB also at this stage has to decide on its OMO. 8 By OMO the CB is assumed to be able to change D by any desired amount, OMO being unlimited in size and direction, so the CB can always achieve its desired expected value of D, i.e., it can make E[D] = D * , on the strong assumption that the demand for money function itself remains unchanged by bank failures. 9 ' 10 8 All practical descriptions of LOLR activities reveal that the CB is under tremendous timepressure to take decisions before the market reopens and has to do so when in possession of only sketchy details of the financial position of the commercial bank needing help. 9 This biases the analysis against LOLR, since in a panic the demand for money function is also liable to become unpredictable. 10 Panics also act to increase uncertainty about the appropriate selection of interest rates, and the analysis can be done similarly. During panics there is a rush to safety, so interest rates on highquality, short-term government paper frequently fall. Since risk-premia and spreads then typically
If the CB does not provide LOLR, the illiquid bank(s) will shut. This will cause the public to move out of deposits into cash, via the linear relationship B 1 j + j²,
where B 1 is a positive coefficient known to the CB, and ² is a stochastic variable, with E[²] = 0 and Var(²) = k, where k is also known to the CB. The loss from getting macro-policy wrong is assumed to be quadratic, and for simplicity as
The identity of the illiquid bank, which has been supported by LOLR, is then made known. If it is insolvent, with probability x, the CB will face a cost Z, where
Thus, in the static model, with h, f and x all given and constant, the CB wishes to minimize the loss functions,
The sequence of events is as in Figure 1 .
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Nature decides, given h, whether a bank or bank(s) seek LOLR from CB.
CB has to decide whether to assist or not. CB knows x, but not the facts in this particular case. CB also undertakes OMO.
The detail of whether the bank(s)are insolvent or just illiquid is revealed. 
The Analysis
By using OMO to off set the expected amount that the public move out of deposits into cash, B 1 j, the CB can always achieve its desired expected value of deposits, i.e.,
But this is the best the CB can achieve by using OMO, as the CB cannot
widen, low quality debt yields may simultaneously increase.
Comparing kj 2 with (n + B 2 j)x, LOLR is preferable if and only if:
That is
Thus we reach our first result regarding the comparison between LOLR and OMO in a static setting.
Proposition 1
In a static setting, LOLR is preferable to OMO if and only if the size of the bank seeking assistance is above a threshold level j; otherwise OMO is preferable.
Clearly the crucial feature of this model is that the costs of allowing a bank to fail (quadratic in j) rise at a faster rate with respect to the size of bank than the costs of rescuing a bank that may turn out to be insolvent (proportional to j). But so long as the costs of failure rise consistently faster than the costs of rescue with respect to size, the same qualitative results will hold.
There are several reasons for this asymmetry. Let us start with the quadratic loss function from policy error, kj 2 . In virtually all the CB independence literature, policy errors, e.g. deviations of inflation from target, are taken to be quadratic. But the justification for quadratic loss functions is rarely profound, and often just based on mathematical convenience. More convincingly, the literature of banking crises and financial contagion as described in the introductory section shows that the damage can spill over from the original bank to many other banks, which can further spill over to many more banks. The total damage is thus a nonlinear function of the size of the original troubled bank. What we claim is that the risks arising from such contagion is a nonlinear convex function of the size of the original troubled bank, and the exact quadratic form is just a mathematical convenience. 11 The technical condition for j < D * is assumed to be satisfied.
Moreover, the costs of rescue rise less fast. Here there are two costs, reputational and financial costs, when the rescued bank is insolvent, with the latter falling on some combination of surviving banks, CB 12 and taxpayers. There is a significant fixed element in reputational costs. The CB may, or may not, make an obvious, publicly observable, error of judgement. Again, there is a fixed cost in making the taxpayer, or other surviving banks, face the reality of having to contribute to an ex post bailout at all. That fixed cost may be large, perhaps even so large that no banks, even the largest, will actually be supported (e.g. see the problem in Japan of sharing out the costs of rescue). But, once taxpayers have come to accept that they must bear the costs of rescue, then our assertion is that the disutility is just proportional to the cash burden.
According to the above proposition, j only depends on x, k, n and B 2 , but not on D * or B 1 . Some comparative statics on j further reveal that j increases as x increases, k decreases, n increases, or B 2 increases. These results have the following intuition: The CB should raise the threshold level of bank size and thus only rescues bigger size banks, when the probability of insolvency x increases, when the risk of deposits moving out of the banking system k decreases, or when either the fixed cost (n) or variable cost (B 2 ) of rescuing banks that turn out to be insolvent increases.
Moreover, if the risk of deposits moving out of banking system k is very small, then j can be very large; thus OMO becomes optimal even for the largest bank; if 12 CB losses may be minimized by an appropriate requirement for collateral. But as Goodfriend and King (1988, p.12) note, "Fully collateralizing a loan with prime paper such as U.S. Treasury bills would make the value of a central bank's line of credit minimal, since a bank could acquire the funds by simply selling the bills on the private market."
Even if a commercial bank seeking help from a CB will usually have used up its best collateral already, (to borrow on finer terms from the market), the CB may be able to extract such tough terms for its LOLR lending that its own resources are largely protected in the case of an insolvency.
But some (junior) creditors would then be hit all the harder, and there would still be a reputational loss to the CB, perhaps the more severe if its was perceived as refusing to take its "share" of the losses -especially if it was also responsible for bank supervision. the probability of insolvency x is very small, then j can be very small; thus LOLR becomes optimal even for very small banks.
We have now formally explained how a policy of "too big to fail" minimizes the CB's loss function in a static setting. But if decisions whether to provide LOLR are a function of the size of the commercial bank in difficulties, one may wonder whether these decisions will make individual choice of risk profile (h) a function of size, and thus contradicting our initial simplifying assumption. Not necessarily so.
Because the benefits that a manager obtains, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, from his (continued) position are a positive function of the size of his bank as well as a function of its profitability, the larger the bank, the less that the manager would want to put his status at risk. So greater size may on the one hand be predicted to lead to more probable CB intervention, but on the other hand to make managers more unwilling to put their own position at risk. Moreover, large size banks may be subject to a tighter monitoring and regulation by CB.
Of course, if the value of j was public knowledge, there would be a discontinuity.
Banks just larger than the cut-off point would have an incentive to increase risk, whereas banks just below the cut-off point would become very risk averse. But j is not generally publicly observable. 13 This is partly because individual banks have idiosyncratic features making the CB more, or less likely, to intervene on their behalf, 14 partly because j varies over time (and in a somewhat unpredictable fashion, as we will show in subsequent sections), and partly because the monetary authorities maintain a policy in this respect of "constructive ambiguity". Indeed our model enables us to interpret this latter as a rational response by the CB precisely to prevent commercial banks' chosen risk profiles becoming a function of size. 15 In summary, we believe that even though the CB response to a commercial bank in difficulties will be a function of the size of that bank, a bank's chosen risk profile need not necessarily be a function of size. "Too big to fail" is widely accepted to be an almost universal phenomenon, yet we are not aware of any empirical finding that risk preference among bankers is a positive function of size. This is not to suggest that commercial banks' risk profile choices do not respond to the actions and signals of the CB. Indeed the next Section focuses directly on that. Rather we claim that our model simplification, whereby all banks react similarly to such CB signals, despite being of differing initial sizes, is sufficiently close to reality to make our model results interesting.
THE DYNAMIC MODEL
In the static model above, the probability of a commercial bank needing LOLR (p), the probability of it then also being insolvent (x) and its risk profile (h) were all taken as given. In this Section we consider the dynamic equilibrium in which, p, x, and h will become time-varying in response of the CB's actions and signals.
There are two main channels of intertemporal interactions that we identify here.
The first is contagion, whereby failure now, when the CB refuses the request of LOLR (S t = 0), is likely to lead to more failures subsequently. The second is moral hazard, whereby a rescue (S t = 1), is likely to cause commercial banks to increase their risk profiles, thereby raising both p and x. In reality, of course, moral hazard will be much worse if the CB provides LOLR assistance to an insolvent bank than to a solvent, but illiquid, bank, (when there might be no moral hazard). We have justified the above simplified assumption with the observation that generally commercial banks, and the general public, will not be able to observe for some time whether a LOLR support exercise involves an insolvent bank, or not, and so will have to condition on the LOLR 15 See, for example, Enoch, Stella and Khamis (1997) for empirical evidence.
action itself, rather than on the full characteristics of the banks supported. 16 In the dynamic setting, this problem the CB faces generalizes to:
where 0 < δ < 1 is discount factor, and 0 ≤ S t ≤ 1 is the CB's control variable. This is subject to the equation of motion of p t or/and x t . We choose to solve the dynamic programming problem by using the Lagrange method. 17 In order to derive basic economic intuitions out of clear-cut closed form solutions, we start our analysis by allowing one of the two stochastic variables, p or x, to vary over time, holding the other fixed. We treat the analysis with p t time-varying (x constant) as primarily about contagion and present it in subsection 3.1; in subsection 3.2 we present the analysis with x t time-varying (p t constant) as focussing on moral hazard. Then in subsection 3.3, we allow both contagion and moral hazard to operate, i.e., with both p t and x t stochastically time-varying. With linearization of the first order conditions around the steady states, we also obtain a closed form solution in this case.
Contagion in Dynamic Model
To focus on the contagion problem, we can set h t + ζ t = x as constant. Thus, the objective function is:
This is subject to the equation of motion for p t , which will depend on the CB's actions, that is either to grant or refuse LOLR (S t = 1 or 0), so that
where ε t+1 is a stochastic term with mean zero and a constant variance. Note that allowing a bank to fail will raise the probability of future failures, i.e., contagion, so that α 1 > 0 and β 1 > 0, so providing LOLR assistance can reduce the probability of failure by containing the contagious risk. With any CB action, in response to a call for assistance from a commercial bank lending, which leads to further difficulties (i.e., p t rising), there is a question whether the banking system is globally stable, and past history suggests that such worries could have some foundation. We show the necessary stability conditions and discuss their economic intuition below.
The Lagrange function of this question is
The first order conditions (FOC) of this Lagrange with respect to S t and p t yield:
For a quadratic objective function like ours, we can conjecture λ t as a linear function:
thus,
. 18 Technically, we should have a further Lagrange multiplier, τ t , and include τ t (1 − p t ) in the Lagrange function to take fully into consideration the case of 0 ≤ p t ≤ 1. For simplicity, we assume 0 < p t < 1 (and 0 < h t < 1) thus τ t = 0, and thus ignore it in the Lagrange function here (and below). We also assume that the technical condition for 0 ≤ S t ≤ 1 is satisfied.
Substituting this E t λ t+1 in (6) and (7) respectively, solving for ρ 0 and ρ 1 , we finally arrive at the following proposition regarding the solution for S t in the case of contagion, denoted as S c t .
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Proposition 2 In dynamic setting, the optimal monetary policy dealing with contagion case is:
whereby:
.
This result has the following implications. Notice first that γ 1 > 0 holds for all the given parameter settings, as long as δα
, which we will further discuss in connection with the stability condition below. Therefore, if p t rises, i.e., there is a structural shift making the banking system less stable, then the CB always wants to accommodate banks' calls for assistance more frequently, i.e.
∂S
c t /∂p t > 0, regardless whether their sizes are above the threshold level or not. Thus it will accommodate banks' calls for assistance more frequently than in the static case and rescue "smaller" as well as all big banks. This should not be surprising when contagion is the main concern of the CB. Moreover, the system will tend to a long-run equilibrium value for p, set as p c , where p c is given by the following equation β 1 j) , or (n + B 2 j)x goes up, or j 2 k goes down. These results are consistent with intuition, because when j 2 k − (n + B 2 j)x > 0, the CB has more incentive to provide LOLR. A higher α 0 implies a higher constant risk level in the banking system; a higher α 1 + β 1 j implies a stronger effect of OMO on the risk level of the banking system; a higher (n + B 2 j)x implies higher costs of LOLR, and a lower j 2 k implies lower costs of OMO. The effect of α 2 + β 2 j on p c is more complicated, as the main instrument in this case is LOLR. The system will fluctuate around p c as ε t varies stochastically.
If j 2 k − (n + B 2 j)x < 0, that is the cost of LOLR is bigger than that of OMO for a given j in the static model, however, then
< 0, and for p c > 0 we need
Comparative statics analysis on p c in this case indicates that p c goes up if α 0 , j 2 k goes up, or (α 2 + β 2 j), (n + B 2 j)x goes down. These results are also consistent with intuition, because when j 2 k − (n + B 2 j)x < 0, the CB has more incentive to provide OMO rather than LOLR. A lower α 2 +β 2 j implies a weaker effect of providing LOLR on the risk level of the banking system. The effect of α 1 + β 1 j on p c is more complicated, as the main instrument in this case is OMO. 20 20 Notice further that, if failures have occurred in a series of large banks, i.e., j 2 k −(n + B 2 j)x > 0, then p c may even be close to its upper bound, 1, for some parameter configurations. The intuition is that when the CB is only concerned with contagious risk, which is more severe for large banks, it would rescue too many banks so that the banking system risk level would then become extremely high. Similarly, if the only failures to have occurred were among small banks, i.e., j 2 k −(n+B 2 j)x < 0, p c may even be close to its lower bound, 0, for some parameter configurations. The intuition is that even when the CB is concerned with contagious risk, yet the troubled banks have been small, it would limit access to LOLR and rather use OMO, so that the banking system risk level would be extremely low.
Furthermore, from the equation of motion for p t above and substituting S t , we get:
Thus in addition to the required stability condition from p c , j 2 k 6 = (n + B 2 j)x, the stability condition (on α 3 and δ) is α 3 − 1 < p α 
It is easy to check that for 0 < δ < 1 there is a non-empty set for α 3 .
Finally, notice that the result of the above proposition can also be interpreted in terms of bank size j. Setting S c t = b S in (9), where b S is close to the upper bound of S t and the CB will accommodate bank j's request for LOLR if S ≥ b S, we get:
Equation (11) becomes a cubic function of j after we multiply [j 2 k − (n + B 2 j)x] (α 1 + β 1 j +α 2 +β 2 j) on its both sides. Thus there may exist either one or three real-number roots, which are functions of all the parameters and variables including p t . Therefore, a same size bank may be rescued by the CB for a given p t , but may not be rescued for another value of p t+1 . This shifting of CB's policy reflects the time dynamics and is caused by the changes in the state-variable p t .
Even for the same value of p t , the CB may optimally rescue only these banks that have the "right sizes". As the above cubic equation (11) may have three realnumber roots, which are non-negative yet smaller than D * , these roots also clearly define useful bank size categories and the CB should rescue these banks within such categories, but not to do so for those banks which are not in the categories.
For a variety of possible parameter settings, some small or large banks may be rescued, while banks whose sizes are intermediate may not be. Consequently, the CB's optimal behavior may appear non-monotonic in bank size and thus ambiguous if viewed from outside, which will further enhance the constructive ambiguity which we described in the above section.
Next we turn to the case of moral hazard.
Moral Hazard in Dynamic Model
We focus on moral hazard by switching off contagion (i.e., holding p constant), but allowing universal risk preference (h) to increase alongside with the probability of a bank requiring assistance also being insolvent (i.e., x rises).
We assume that x is a linear function of h, and without loss of generality we set the coefficient equal to unity, so x t = h t . With p constant, we can drop that from the CB's objective function, which involves setting S t so as to minimize:
subject to the equation of motion for h, whereby:
Where e t+1 is a stochastic term with mean zero and a constant variance, and a 1 > 0,
Again, the Lagrange function of this question is:
The FOC of this Lagrange with respect to S t and h t yield:
(n + B 2 j)S t + δa 3 E t l t+1 = l t .
Again, we can conjecture l t as a linear function:
Substituting this E t l t+1 in (14) and (15) respectively, solving for r 0 and r 1 , we finally arrive at the following proposition regarding the solution for S t in the case of moral hazard, denoted as S m t .
Proposition 3
In dynamic setting, the optimal monetary policy dealing with moral hazard case is:
This result has the following implications. Notice first that g 1 < 0 holds for all given parameter settings. Therefore, if h t rises, i.e., there is a structural shift making the risk level in the banking system higher, then the CB will accommodate less often, i.e. ∂S m t /∂h t < 0, regardless of the banks' sizes; and vice versa. This is obviously the opposite case to contagion, whereby ∂S c t /∂p t > 0, and thus the CB always wants to accommodate banks' calls for assistance more often.
The system will tend to a long-run equilibrium value for h, set as h m , where h m is
given by the following equation
For δa The equilibrium risk level in moral hazard does not so critically depend on the sizes of failing banks as it did in the previous contagion case. Although the equilibrium risk level does depend on the average size of failing banks, in particular the higher is that average size, the higher is the equilibrium risk level for a 1 + b 1 j > a 0 , the difference is much smaller than in contagion. These results are again consistent with intuition, because when moral hazard is the sole concern of the CB, then it should always have strong incentive to reject the request from the troubled banks for LOLR, and as a result of such an extreme policy, the equilibrium risk level in the banking system should be quite low, for small and large banks as well.
Furthermore, from the equation of motion for h t above and substituting S t , we get:
Thus, similar to the case of contagion alone, the stability conditions are:
Again combining this condition with 1/ √ δ < a 3 < 1/δ, and noticing that 1+δ 2δ
for 0 < δ < 1, we thus have:
And it is easy to check that there is a non-empty set for a 3 .
In the case of moral hazard, bank size does not play a key role. When contagion is the main concern of the CB, it is the big banks which worry the CB most, and require the CB's prompt LOLR action. If moral hazard is the main concern of the CB, CB's rescuing policy is more uniform across banks with different sizes. The banking system can be more easily stabilized (than that in the case of contagion alone); and the stability conditions do not depend on the size of the illiquid banks.
Once again, the threshold (j) for LOLR with moral hazard is time-varying. Again setting S m t = b S, we get:
Multiplying (a 1 + b 1 j + a 2 + b 2 j) on both sides of equation (18), it becomes a linear increasing function of j. Thus there exists a real-number root, which is a function of all the parameters and variables including h t . Therefore, a same size bank may be rescued by the CB for a low value of h t , but may not be rescued when h t+1 increases.
This changing of CB's policy reflects the time dynamics and is caused by the changes in time-varying state-variable, h t .
As the left-hand-side of equation (18) is a monotonic increasing function of j, and thus a cut-off point in j, b j, exists for a given h t and a rescue threshold b S, the CB will rescue any bank with size above b j(h t , b S). Therefore, "too big too fail" holds even in the dynamic setting with moral hazard being the main concern.
Contagion and Moral Hazard in Dynamic Model
When both p and x are allowed to be time-varying, we assume (as above) that x is a linear function of h, and we set the coefficient equal to unity, so x t = h t . Thus the new problem is to set S t optimally so as to minimize:
subject to the equations of motion for h t and p t , whereby:
where again ε t+1 and e t+1 are stochastic terms with mean zero and constant variances, and all other coefficients are positive.
The FOC of this Lagrange with respect to S t , h t and p t yield, respectively:
Intuitively, the joint case of contagion and moral hazard is some form of convex combination of each case alone, with both h t and p t changing over time. As discussed above, the contagion case is a special case of the joint case, with h t fixed; and similarly, the moral hazard case is a special case of the joint case, with p t fixed.
To solve a problem with a quadratic first order conditions like ours, we shall start with linearization of the FOC around the steady state. 21 Doing so leads to:
Where h and p denote the steady state for h t and p t respectively, and S denotes S t evaluated at h and p.
With a linear FOCs, we can conjecture 
Following the same procedure as in the case of contagion, or moral hazard, we finally arrive at the following proposition regarding the solution for S t in the joint case of contagion and moral hazard, denoted as S * t .
Proposition 4
In the dynamic setting, the optimal monetary policy dealing with both contagion and moral hazard is:
This result has the following implications. Notice first that µ h < 0 holds, except for the case in which ∆ h < 0 and 2p + δα 3 ∆ h > 0, which happens if δa 3 p(a 1 + b 1 j + a 2 + b 2 j) > 1 and 2p + δα 3 ∆ h > 0. In general, we shall expect µ h < 0, and thus similar to the case of moral hazard alone, if h t rises, i.e., there is a structural shift making the risk level in the banking system higher, then the CB will accommodate less often, i.e. ∂S * t /∂h t < 0, regardless whether the banks' sizes are above or below some cutoff points; and vice versa. Notice that, unlike in the case of moral hazard alone, µ h becomes dependent on many parameters, including the equilibrium states, h, S, and p which were not in the moral hazard case alone.
Moreover, because ∆ p > 0, µ p > 0 if and only if
A strong condition for this to be true is
that is the cost of LOLR is smaller than that of OMO when the risk level is in equilibrium. More precisely,
2k , thus j * < j(x = h) and it is smaller than the cutoff size in the static model.
We may compare this result with that for contagion alone. In the case of contagion alone, γ 1 > 0 holds regardless of bank size, and so the CB always had an incentive to rescue banks. In the joint case, the CB will only provide LOLR for large banks. The CB is still willing to provide LOLR even if moral hazard effects are considered, but its incentives to provide LOLR are not as strong as in the case where moral hazard is excluded.
Similarly, the system will tend to a long-run equilibrium value for both h and p, set as h and p, which are more complicated than in the case of moral hazard or contagion alone. But it is quite easy to see that both the equilibrium risk levels, h and p, critically depend on the average size of failing banks. p critically depends on bank size, because µ p critically depends on bank size. To see that h also critically depends on bank size, we shall take notice that the equilibrium p ultimately affect h.
The dynamics of the joint case of contagion and moral hazard are more interesting and complicated. From our above analysis, we can see that the system will, as before, fluctuate with the stochastic shocks, but also both contagion and moral hazard provide an inbuilt cycling mechanism. When h t is (temporarily) low, the CB will be induced to accommodate more, but that will signal the commercial banks to raise h t and raise the contagion risk p t , which will cause the CB to refuse accommodation more often, and so on. For plausible values of the coefficients, however, we would expect this cycle to be damped. But the combination of stochastic shocks to riskiness together with this inbuilt damped cycling mechanism will always leave the choice of whether to accommodate, or not, fluctuating around its long-run equilibria.
Finally, there may be multiple values of j around which CB's policy should shift,
and such values will always be changing over time, more often and perhaps more strongly than in the contagion case alone, as can be seen more clearly below.
If we set S * t = b S in (22), we get:
This is a high-order equation in j, hence there may exist several real-number roots which are obviously functions of all the parameters and variables including h t and p t .
Thus, when h t and/or p t change, CB should adjust its rescuing policy accordingly.
Therefore, a bank of equal size may be rescued by the CB for a set of values for h t and p t , but may not be rescued when h t+1 and p t+1 change. Such a shift in CB's policy reflects the time dynamics and is caused by the changes in time-varying variables, h t and p t .
Moreover, even for the same value of h t and p t , the CB may optimally rescue only these banks that have the "right sizes". For the above high-order equation (23), there may be several real number roots which are non-negative yet smaller than D * . These roots also clearly define bank size categories and the CB should rescue these banks within such categories, but not rescue banks outside these categories.
CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a model of the lender of last resort. In a simple static setting, the CB should only rescue banks above a threshold size. This result provides an analytical basis for the well known "too big too fail" syndrome. If that key threshold size were known to commercial banks, it would influence their risk preferences.
To avoid this the regulatory authorities should, and do, use "constructive ambiguity" to make their decisions on which banks they are likely to rescue.
In a dynamic setting, wherein both the probability of a failure and the likelihood of a bank requiring LOLR being insolvent in each period are a function of CB's prior actions, which then influence the actions of banks and depositors, we focus our analysis on the effects of contagion and/or moral hazard. We show that CB's optimal rescuing policy, whether to support or not, depends not only on bank size, but also on the time-varying variables, such as the probability of a failure and the likelihood of a bank requiring LOLR being insolvent.
Unlike the static setting wherein the CB only rescues banks above a single threshold size, in dynamic setting with concern on contagion CB's optimal rescuing policy may be non-monotonic in bank size, and its optimal policy is time-varying. More importantly, we have found that if contagion is the main concern, then the CB in general would have an excessive incentive to rescue banks through LOLR, though its incentives to rescue big (small) banks are very strong (weak) and thus the equilibrium risk level is high (low). If moral hazard is the main concern, then the CB in general would have less incentive to rescue banks through LOLR than in the dynamic setting with contagion alone, and it should only rescue banks above a threshold size.
When both contagion and moral hazard are included as main concerns, then the CB's incentives to rescue though LOLR are stronger than in the static setting but weaker than in the dynamic setting with contagion alone, and the CB's optimal policy in handling moral hazard is similar to the dynamic setting with moral hazard alone.
A key result coming out of our model is that contagion is the key factor affecting CB's incentive in providing LOLR, while moral hazard is not. When contagion is the main concern, the CB has a very strong incentive to provide LOLR. When moral hazard is also included, in the joint case, even though it weakens the CB's incentive to rescue in general, its effects are quite week, and the qualitative features of CB's incentive remain the same as when contagion is the main concern. This is so because moral hazard can be viewed as an unpleasant by-product of contagion. If it was not for worries about contagion, then CB's incentive to provide LOLR would be very weak, and consequently there would be very little moral hazard.
This conclusion has some implications for the ongoing debates over CB's, and in particular the IMF's, rescuing policy in financial crises. When contagion becomes a main concern, even if moral hazard is also present, LOLR becomes (perceived as ) necessary and justified. Attacks on such LOLR policies, largely based on arguments from moral hazard, are insufficient and unsatisfactory unless they also address the possibility of contagion. 22 Turning finally to further possible research, in our model we have assumed that commercial bank managers' appetite for risk remains constant as size varies. This was because we assumed that the incentive for risk-taking inherent in too-big-to-fail was (roughly) balanced by the greater risk aversion of managers in high status large banks. This assumption can be examined. In future work, we intend to model the incentives on commercial bank managers, in such a game, more rigorously. We also wish to examine the effects of contagion and moral hazard on the optimal decision of international lender of last resort.
